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CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYER'S BEWARE: THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT IN HARRIS V. FORKLIFT
SYSTEMS, INC., 114 S. CT. 376 (1993), MAKES IT EASIER FOR EMPLOYEES
TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT BASED ON A HOSTILE
WORKING ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 1991, Americans were glued to their television
sets as Professor Anita Hill revealed to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee her allegations that Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas
repeatedly pressured her for dates and graphically described to her
scenes from pornographic films.' For many viewers, and possibly
some Senators, 2 it was the first time they were aware that a sexual
harassment claim could be based on a hostile working environment.
However, courts and businesses had been struggling with "hostile"
or "abusive" work environment claims for years.' In fact, over
900o 4 of the Fortune 500 companies received harassment complaints
costing the average large corporation approximately 6.7 million dol-
lars a year.5
Because there was no clear definition 6 of sexual harassment,
courts decided claims on a case by case basis reminiscent of the
1. Michael Hedges, Colleagues Call Charges 'Incredible, Preposterous', WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al.
2. See Anne C. Levy, The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Hearings, 1991 Wis.
L. REV. 1106 (1991). Professor Levy severely criticized the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's performance at the hearings: "Any of the hundreds of judges who have
heard sexual harassment cases could have easily enlightened the Senators on a
variety of issues with which the Judiciary Committee could not seem to come to
terms and, which it, ultimately, was incapable of handling in an appropriate
manner." Levy, supra, at 1110.
3. Levy, supra note 2, at 1107.
4. Anne B. Fisher, Sexual Harassment: What to Do? FORTUNE, Aug. 1993,
at 84.
5. Id. (citing research performed by Freada Klein Associates, a work place
diversity consulting firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts). In addition, research by
Bettina Plevan, a specialist in defending sexual harassment lawsuits, reveals that
an average company spends approximately $200,000 handling each valid complaint.
Id. Likewise, Richard Hafets, a specialist in labor law, estimates that sexual
harassment litigation will cost American businesses over $1 billion in damages and
attorneys' fees in the next five years. Id.
6. In 1984, Nadine Strossen of the American Civil Liberties Union narrowly
defined sexual harassment as "a severe pattern of conduct or expression, directed
at a specific employee, that demonstrably hinders his or her job performance."
Jeffery Rosen, Reasonably Women: "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harass-
ment Litigation, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 1993, at 12.
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"I'll know it, when I see it" test used by the Supreme Court in
obscenity cases. 7 Courts struggled to draw a line somewhere in the
gray area between the mere utterance of an epithet and forcible
rape.' In an effort to more clearly define this distinction, some
circuit courts of appeals created a bright line rule requiring psy-
chological injury, 9 while other circuits opted for a totality of the
circumstances balancing approach. 0 Finally, on November 9, 1993,
a unanimous United States Supreme Court, in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.," resolved the conflict among the circuits by estab-
lishing a standard for conduct that constitutes sexual harassment
based on a hostile working environment.1
2
II. FACTS
Teresa Harris was a Rental Manager for Forklift Systems from
April 22, 1985, until October 1, 1987.'1 During her employment,
Harris was frequently the target of unwelcomed sexual innuendos
from Forklift's president, Charles Hardy.' 4 On several occasions,
Hardy insulted Harris in the presence of other employees by making
statements such as: "You're a dumb ass woman," "You're a woman,
what do you know," and "We need a man as a rental manager."'"
In fact, Hardy went so far as to ridicule Harris in the presence of
7. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart explained that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not extend protection to what he termed "hard-core pornography."
Id. Admitting that "hard-core pornography" was very difficult, if not impossible,
to define, Justice Stewart stated:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hard-core pornog-
raphy]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
.1. n
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991).
9. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Downes v.
Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indust., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
11. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
12. Id. at 371.
13. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444, at *j, (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991).
14. Id. at *2.
15. Id.
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a client by suggesting, "[We should] go to the Holiday Inn to
negotiate [your] raise."' 6 In addition to degrading Harris, Hardy
frequently insulted other female employees by asking them to retrieve
objects he dropped on the floor, by making sexual innuendos re-
garding their clothing, and even by suggesting they retrieve coins
from his front pants pocket.
17
Upset by Hardy's conduct, Harris dreaded going to work, cried
frequently, and drank heavily.' 8 Finally, on August 18, 1987, Harris
complained to Hardy about his behavior and threatened to resign. 19
Initially, Hardy apologized for his conduct and dismissed his behavior
as friendly joking. 20 However, in early September, Hardy resumed
his prior behavior by suggesting that Harris had promised sexual
favors to a client in order to obtain an account. 2' Harris resigned
on October 1, 1987, and sued Forklift for gender discrimination
claiming that Hardy's harassing conduct created a hostile working
environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22
Although the district court found Hardy's conduct offensive,
23
the court dismissed his behavior as an adolescent annoyance 24 and
part of Forklift's joking environment. 25 The court was influenced
by several factors, including: Mr. and Mrs. Harris's social rela-
tionship with Hardy; Forklift's termination of Mr. Harris's profitable
business account; 26 and Mrs. Harris's two year delay in reporting
Hardy's conduct. 27
16. Id. Chief District Judge Nixon commented: "At trial, plaintiff tried to get
far too much mileage out of Hardy's comment that they would negotiate her raise
at the Holiday Inn." Id. at *7.
17. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
18. Harris, 1991 WL 487444, at *3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. In front of other employees, Hardy asked, "What did you do, promise
the guy ... some 'bugger' Saturday night?" Id.
22. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
23. Harris, 1991 WL 487444, at *5. The District Court stated: "I believe that
Hardy is a vulgar man and demeans the female employees at this work place."
Id.
24. Id. at *6.
25. Id. Judge Nixon wrote: "I appreciate that plaintiff, as a management
employee, was more sensitive to these comments than clerical employees, who it
appears were conditioned to accept denigrating treatment." Id.
26. Id. at *4. The court explained: "I am certain that Hardy's business rela-
tionship with plaintiff's husband played more of a role in the plaintiff's dissat-
isfaction with her job than admitted." Id. The court ignored, however, Forklift's
canceling of the account on October 7, 1987, some six days after Harris quit her
job with Forklift. See id. at *3-*4.
27. Id. at *7.
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The district court acknowledged that Hardy's behavior offended
Harris and also would have offended a "reasonable woman manager"
under similar circumstances. 28 However, the court was not convinced
that Hardy's conduct was so severe as to seriously affect Harris's
psychological well-being, 29 regardless of her testimony to the con-
trary.30 Because Harris could not demonstrate psychological injury,
the district court dismissed her claims3 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.32 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts of
appeal as to whether psychological injury was required for a hostile
environment harassment claim to be actionable.
3
III. BACKGROUND
In order to appreciate the sinificance of the Harris decision, it
is important to understand the evolution of the legal action known
as sexual harassment based on a hostile working environment. First,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited
discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or gender.
3 4
Second, the definition of discrimination was expanded to include
an indirect form of discrimination known as the "abusive or hostile
working environment." 35 Third, sexual harassment was recognized
as a type of hostile environment discrimination.3 6 Fourth, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission promulgated guidelines which
established the five elements of sexual harassment based on a hostile
working environment claim.3 7 Finally, the lower courts struggled to
define what behavior rises to the level of harassing conduct,3" which




31. Id. at *9. Harris's additional claims of constructive discharge and disparate
treatment were also denied. Id. Because the court did not find Harris's claim
groundless, no attorneys' fees were awarded to Forklift Systems. Id.
32. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 367 (1993).
33. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
35. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39
(5th Cir. 1971); see infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
36. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); see also Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-02 (lth Cir. 1982); see infra notes 71-91
and accompanying text.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993). See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 123-185 and accompanying text.
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A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The summer of 1963 was the turbulent time of President
Kennedy's Report to the American People on Civil Rights and the
civil rights march on Washington, highlighted by Martin Luther
King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech.3 9 A significant victory
in the battle to end racial discrimination came almost one year later
when the Civil Rights Act was proposed. Specifically, Title VII of
the Act4° made discrimination against employees in the "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment an unlawful employment
practice.
4'
Although this prohibition originally applied to discrimination
based upon an individual's race, religion, or national origin, the
proposed bill was silent as to gender discrimination. 42 Drafters justified
the exclusion by referring to a letter from the President's Commission
on the Status of Women which suggested that gender discrimination
was such a significantly different issue as to require separate
legislation.43 In a calculated effort to defeat the proposed Act,
Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia introduced an
amendment to add the word "sex" to the proposed Act. 44 Opponents
39. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement? 42 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1989).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(h)(6) (1988). The various titles of the Act cover: Title
I-Voting Rights, Title II-Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of
Public Accommodation, Title Ill-Desegregation of Public Facilities, Title IV-
Desegregation of Public Education, Title V-Commission of Civil Rights, Title
VI-Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, Title VII-Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, Title VIII-Registration and Voting Statistics, Title IX-Inter-
vention and Procedure After Removal in Civil Rights Cases, Title X-Establishment
of Community Relations Service, and Title XI-Miscellaneous. Id.
41. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
42. S. 1732, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); see also Elizabeth Roth, Legislative
History Shows Sex Bias Law Seems to Have Started as a Joke, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 16, 1992, at 5.
43. 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2577 (1964).
44. Id.; see also Roth, supra note 42, at 5. Representative Smith's introduction
included a mock protest of sincerity as he read from a constituent's letter ordering
Congress to stop sending American men to war so that the spinsters of America
could find husbands and raise families. Roth, supra note 42, at 5.
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of the bill joined Smith in a chivalrous 45 protest, stating that the
amendment was necessary in order to afford white women the same
employment opportunities granted to other "minority"'
46 groups. 47
Representative Smith's efforts were successful; the amendment
was added to the proposed Civil Rights Act. 48 However, much to
Representative Smith's and his supporters' dismay, the amendment
did not ensure the Act's defeat. The Civil Rights Act, including the
amendment against gender discrimination, passed both the House
and the Senate and was signed by President Johnson on August 2,
1964.
4 9
B. A Hostile Working Environment is a Type of Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate in the "terms, conditions, or
privileges" of employment.50 Although the plain language of Title
VII obviously would support actions alleging direct discrimination
such as unfair treatment in wages, working hours, or available
positions, in Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,5
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized
a more subtle or indirect form of discrimination based on an
"environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. 5 2
45. See Roth, supra note 42, at 5. During the debate, Representative J. Russell
Tuten of Georgia proclaimed: "Some men in some areas of the country might
support legislation which would discriminate against women, but never let it be
said that a southern gentleman would vote for such legislation." Roth, supra note
42, at 5.
46. Roth, supra note 42, at 5. Representative Bolton, one of the few female
representatives, corrected Smith's categorization of women as a minority group,
citing the 1960 U.S. Census which revealed that there were 90,991,681 women and
only 88,331,494 men in the United States. Roth, supra note 42, at 5.
47. Roth, supra note 42, at 5. Their true motivations and fears were revealed
in statement's such as Representative Mendel Rivers' assertion that the amendment
"would make it possible for the white Christian woman to receive the same
consideration for employment as the colored women," and Representative J. George
William Andrews' comment that "[u]nless this amendment is adopted, the white
women of this country would be drastically discriminated against in favor of the
Negro woman." Roth, supra note 42, at 5.
48. 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2584 (1964). The amendment passed by a vote of
168 to 133. Id.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). See supra note 41 for the full text of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.
51. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
52. Id. at 238. ("Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination.")
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In Rogers, doctors in an optometry clinic segregated and separately
treated patients based on their national origin. 3 A hispanic nurse
working for the clinic filed a Title VII action, alleging that the
clinic's discrimination toward the patients was an unlawful employment
practice under the Civil Rights Act.5 4 Although the district court
agreed that the segregation was unlawful, the court noted that the
discriminatory conduct was directed toward the patients, not the
employee." Therefore, the plaintiff was not an aggrieved party under
the protection of the Act, and her complaint was dismissed.
6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit relied on a more liberal interpretation of the Act's prohibition
against discrimination.5 7 The court interpreted the phrase "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" 58 to extend far beyond
direct discrimination in such matters as wages and hours.5 9 In addition
to economic benefits, the Act also protects an employee's psychological
well-beingA0 The court concluded that forcing employees to work
in an environment heavily charged with hostility directed at them
was a more "sophisticated ' 6' and indirect form of discrimination
also prohibited by the Civil Rights Act. 62 By so ruling, the Fifth
Circuit recognized a new form of discrimination based on a hostile
working environment. 63 As a result, employees such as the plaintiff
gained a cause of action under Title VII of the Act.64
The court refrained from defining the degree of behavior necessary
to constitute a sufficiently hostile environment. Instead, the court
merely stated that the requisite behavior fell somewhere between a
mere ethnic or racial slur and a "working environment so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional




57. Id. at 238 ("We must be acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order
to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness,
and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.").
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); see supra note 41 for the full text of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.
59. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 ("Recognizing the importance of these [intangible]
benefits, we should neither ignore their need for protection, nor blind ourselves
to their potential misuse.").
60. Id.
61. Id. at 238-39.
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and psychological stability of the minority group workers. ' 65 In
future cases this quote served as a source of great debate and
confusion among the circuit courts."
C. Sexual Harassment Creates a Type of Hostile Working
Environment
After Rogers, courts applied the newly created claim of
discrimination based on a hostile working environment to cases
involving race, 67 religion,68 and national origin. 69 It was not until
eleven years later, 70 however, that a court applied this action to
gender discrimination.
7'
In Henson v. City of Dundee, a female police dispatcher claimed
that the chief of police frequently inquired about her sex life, directed
sexual vulgarities towards her, and requested she have sex with him.
72
The district court stated that although the dispatcher had a valid
state action for sexual harassment, gender discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act was an entirely different cause of action.
73
65. Id. at 238. While explaining that a hostile and discriminatory environment
could constitute an unlawful employment practice under the Act, the court stated:
"One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrim-
ination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the eradication
of such noxious practices." Id.
66. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis,
549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Banta v. United States, 434
U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
68. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
69. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87
(8th Cir. 1977).
70. In the history of civil rights lPgislation, "omen's rights havc been O
significantly later than those of racial minorities. For example, African Americans
were given the vote in 1870 by the Fifteenth Amendment, while women did not
obtain that same right until fifty years later with passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment in 1920. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XV, XIX. Likewise, the Supreme Court
declared race a suspect classification for equal protection purposes in Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944), while the Court declared gender a
semi-suspect classification some twenty-nine years later in Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
71. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 899.
73. Id. at 900. During the opening statement, the court explained to the plaintiff's
attorney:
In other words a discrimination case is one thing, do you understand? It
is based on being a female and [being] treated differently from the males.
That is a clear proposition, no question about it, but when you mix up
the other [sexual harassment] with it then you are in an area that is
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Disregarding the prohibition against indirect discrimination, better
known as hostile working environment discrimination, the district
court dismissed the dispatcher's case due to her failure to demonstrate
any tangible or direct discrimination based on her gender.7"
Citing the Rogers opinion, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reminded the district court that, as with
the claims of racial discrimination, Title VII also applies to a hostile
working environment based on an employee's gender.75 The court
proceeded to reconcile sexual harassment and gender discrimination
claims, explaining that a pattern of harassing behavior toward members
of one sex is a type of unlawful, disparate treatment clearly within
the scope of Title VII.7 6 Because the district court failed to consider
sexual harassment as a type of hostile working environment
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit remanded
the case.77
Four years later the Supreme Court supported the Henson ruling
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.7 8 In Meritor, a bank teller alleged
she agreed to have sex with her supervisor fearing she would otherwise
lose her job. 79 During the next three years of her employment, the
plaintiff alleged the supervisor made repeated demands for sex,
fondled her in the presence of other employees, followed her into
the restroom, and exposed himself to her.80 The plaintiff conceded
uncertain. So, we will have to hear it, but the Court doesn't think too
much of it. If she quit that job because of sexual harassment that is a
State case. That is a State proposition. She can sue someone in the County
of the State of Florida, but not in the Federal court. I think that is the
law on the subject. We will hear your case, but that is what you are up
against. Go ahead.
Id. at 900 n.2.
74. Id. at 900-01.
75. Id. at 902. The court stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality
at the work place that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Id.
76. Id. at 902 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
77. Id. at 905.
78. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
79. Id. at 60. This is an example of quid pro quo sexual harassment in which
an employer threatens retaliation if the employee refuses to engage in sexual relations.
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
80. Id. After the initial date, the supervisor did not promise employment benefits
or threaten retaliation. Id. Therefore, instead of quid pro quo harassment the
supervisor's actions became hostile environment sexual harassment. See infra note
97 and accompanying text.
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she had intercourse with her supervisor forty to fifty times during
this period, that she did not report the behavior or utilize her
employer's grievance procedure, and that the alleged harassment
ceased when she started dating a new boyfriend."'
Based on the teller's admissions, the district court found the
relationship to be voluntary and thus dismissed the bank teller's
harassment claim.12 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case because the lower
court failed to consider either hostile environment harassment or
quid pro quo harassment.8 3 Upon denial of a request for rehearing
en banc s4 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.85
As had the Fifth Circuit in Rogers, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the intent of Title VII was to remove all
discriminatory barriers including a hostile working environment. 6
While explaining that Title VII's protections extend beyond the
economic aspects of employment, the Court quoted the language
from Rogers that described the hypothetical working environment
as being "so heavily polluted with discrimination" that it destroyed
the workers' psychological stability. 7 This quotation created a division
among the circuit courts as some circuits cited this language for the
proposition that psychological injury was required in order to bring
an action for sexual harassment based on a hostile working
environment, while others did not. 8
In Meritor, the Supreme Court recognized that sexual harassment
is a type of discrimination because it deprives the victim of the right
to participate in the workplace on equal footing with others who'
are similarly situated.8 9 In addition, the Third Circuit acknowledged
81. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
82. Vingon v- Thvlor. Nn. 7R-1793, 19R0 W t 10 nt *7 1.D.C. Feb. 26,
1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
83. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
84. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom., Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
85. PSFS Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985).
86. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
87. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit stated
that "[olne can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability
of the minority group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed
at eradication of such noxious practices." Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
88. See infra notes 127-64 and accompanying text.
89. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67.
[Vol. 17:839
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that sexual harassment deters women from accepting or continuing
certain jobs and thus is the very type of obstacle that the Act was
designed to remove. 90
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Henson, the Supreme
Court in Meritor refused to set the paramaters for behavior that
constituted sexual harassment. Instead, the Court merely stated that
to be actionable, the sexual harassment must be "sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment.' "91 This standard proved
to be more vague than helpful as lower courts continued to struggle
with sexual harassment cases.
D. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines
In response to the confusion created by Meritor, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission promulgated guidelines on
sexual harassment. 92 The guidelines define sexual harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... [when] such
conduct has the purpose or effect of . . . creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." 93
There are three types of sexual harassment claims: quid pro
quo, reverse quid pro quo, and hostile working environment. 94 Similar
to the contract term meaning "bargained for exchange," a "quid
pro quo" claim involves the exchange of employment benefits for
sexual favors. 95 A "reverse quid pro quo" claim asserts that an
90. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
91. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982)). The Court added that the plaintiff's allegations included "not
only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature."
Id. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded
the case for consideration of the plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination based
on a hostile working environment. Id. at 73.
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1994). However, it should be noted that these
guidelines are only persuasive, and are not mandatory authority. General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
94. ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41A.42
(2d ed. 1993); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (differentiating the three types of
discrimination without using the same terms).
95. The E.E.O.C. guidelines recognize this type of sexual harassment, stating:
Unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of an individual's employment, [or) (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
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employer denied the plaintiff benefits that the employer offered to
the harassed employee. 96 In this situation, an employer may be liable
for two separate causes of action based on one supervisor's
misconduct. Finally, hostile working environment is harassment that
creates an uncomfortable working environment.
97
E. Elements of the Sexual Harassment Based on a Hostile
Working Environment Claim
In addition to the E.E.O.C. guidelines, the courts clarified the
hostile working environment claim by establishing the following five
elements of a prima facie cases: 9 (1) the employee belonged to a
protected class, (2) the employee was the subject of unwelcome
sexual conduct, (3) the harassment was based on sex, (4) the employer
was liable, and (5) the harassment created.a hostile environment. 99
ployment decision affecting such individual ...
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1), (2). For example it would constitute quid pro quo
harassment if a supervisor promised a promotion to a worker if she slept with
him, or conversely, threatened to fire her if she refused. For a more elaborate
discussion of quid pro quo sexual harassment, see BARARA LINDEMAN & DAVID
D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 129-156 (BNA Books 1992);
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 94, § 41A.42. For an Eighth Circuit decision con-
cerning quid pro quo sexual harassment, see Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
96. The E.E.O.C. guidelines recognize reverse quid pro quo discrimination,
stating:
Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an
individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrim-
ination against other persons who were qualified for but denied the em-
ployment opportunity or benefit.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g). For example, reverse quid pro quo discrimination would
occur if a co-worker was more qualified for the position than another worker who
was promoted because she was having an affair with the supervisor.
97. The E.E.O.C. guidelines recognize hostile environment sexual harassment,
stating:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute harassment when ...
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
98. In order to defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant must prove
either that the events did not occur, the occurrences were too trivial to constitute
a violation, or the existence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the conduct.
See Jana Howard Carey & Sandra Saltzman Fink, Overview of Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIG. 1993, (Practicing Law Insitute
1993).
99. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1986); Burns v.
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First, plaintiffs must first prove they belong to a protected class.
This is the least contested element in sex discrimination cases because
gender is automatically a protected classification.'°° However, a sexual
discrimination action is not limited to female plaintiffs. To the
contrary, males as well as females may bring a claim for sexual
harassment. 101
Second, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged harassing
behavior was unwelcome. This element is difficult to prove.102 Often,
the cases are reduced to a swearing match between the two parties,
and what actually occurs in some cases may simply rest upon a
difference in perception between the individuals involved.10 3
The general definition of unwelcome conduct is unsolicited or
unencouraged behavior that a plaintiff regards as uninvited or
offensive. 1°4 The most difficult situations arise when a plaintiff
voluntarily enters the relationship and later wishes it to end. This
was the situation in Meritor where the bank teller engaged in a
sexual relationship with her supervisor for three years. 05 Importantly,
the Supreme Court stressed that the defendant may not use the
plaintiff's initial voluntary participation as a defense to a sexual
harassment charge. °6 Instead, the Supreme Court stated a court must
determine whether the plaintiff indicated by her conduct that the
alleged sexual advances were no longer welcome. 10 7
According to the E.E.O.C. guidelines, the jury is to consider
the totality of the circumstances' ° including the victim's speech,
dress, and conduct.1°9 One commentator has argued that an analysis
McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992); Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 292-95 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-905 (lth Cir. 1982).
100. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that
it is not usually disputed whether the plaintiff is a member of a protected class).
101. Heubschen v. Department of Health & Social Serv., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th
Cir. 1983).
102. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 ("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim
is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' ").
103. See infra notes 165-66.
104. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).
105. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. See also supra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text.
106. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
107. Id.
108. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
109. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that the
district court could admit evidence of the bank teller's sexually provocative dress
and publicly expressed sexual fantasies in order to decide the element of unwelcome
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of a plaintiff's behavior may divert attention from a defendant's
conduct, which should be the heart of the sexual harassment claim." 0
Third, the alleged harassment must be based on sex. This does
not require that the conduct be of a sexual nature, rather that one
gender be treated differently than the other. In other words, but
for the victim's gender, he or she would not have been harassed."'
It is important to note that if the offender harasses both men and
women employees, creating an uncomfortable working environment
for everyone, there is no discrimination and therefore no Title VII
action. 1 2 In addition, the harasser may be the same gender as the
victim. "
Fourth, the plaintiff must establish employer liability."14 The
E.E.O.C. suggested that employers should be held strictly liable for
their employees' wrongful actions." 5 In Meritor, the Supreme Court
rejected the E.E.O.C.'s suggestion, but declined to create a definite
rule on employer liability." 16 Instead, the majority instructed lower
conduct. Id. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit initially determined in a sexual harassment
case that nude pictures of the plaintiff were relevant. Burns v. McGregor Elec.
Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992). Only a few months later, the Eighth
Circuit reversed itself, holding that sexual conduct outside of work was irrelevant
while sexual behavior on the job was relevant. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indust.,
989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993).
110. See Rhonda Werner, Exposing Employers in the Hostile Work Environment:
Appearance Standards That Lead to Sexual Harassment, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 145
(1994).
Ill. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (lth Cir. 1982); see also
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).
112. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
113. See, e.g., Jones v. Commander, Kan. Army Ammunitions Plant, 147 F.R.D.
248 (D. Kan. 1993) (regarding a female who harassed another female); Showalter
v. Allison Reed Group, 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991) (regarding a male harassed
by another male).
114. This note provides only limited coverage of employer liability, which is a
detailed area of the law. For more elaborate coverage of employer liability in sexual
harassment cases, see LINDEMAN & KANDUE, supra note 95. See also Peter M.
Panken et al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Employer Liability for the
Sins of the Wicked, C874 ALI-ABA 385 (1993) (suggesting procedures employers
should implement in order to avoid liability for sexual harassment cases).
115. The guidelines state that an employer "is responsible for its acts and those
of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless
of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by
the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known
of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
116. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Rehnquist, writing for five Justices and concurred
with by Justice Stevens, suggested that courts look to agency law. Id. Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun stated there should be strict liability when the
harasser is a supervisor with authority over the plaintiff. Id. at 74-77 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
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courts to follow principles of agency law. 117 Subsequently, courts
have ruled that employers are liable only if they knew or had reason
to know of the alleged harassment but failed to take remedial
action." ' A plaintiff can show the employer had actual knowledge
of the harassment by proving that she complained to a supervisor
or filed a grievance form. 119 If a plaintiff fails to do either of these
things, then she may establish the employer had constructive knowledge
of the harassment due to its pervasiveness.
20
F. Definition of Conduct that Constitutes Sexual Harassment
Finally, the fifth and most controversial element of a hostile
environment claim is that the alleged conduct must rise to the level
of sexual harassment. A hostile working environment action under
Title VII requires the courts to apply both an objective and subjective
standard.' 12 A plaintiff must prove that a reasonable person, as well
as the particular plaintiff, would consider the alleged conduct to be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . to alter the conditions of ...
employment and create an abusive working environment.' 12 2 The
objective standard protects employers from hypersensitive employees,
while the subjective standard ensures that the particular plaintiff
suffered injury.1
23
Even with the aid of the subjective and objective standards,
separating actionable from unactionable claims proved to be an
arduous task. Subtle differences in factual situations produced different
outcomes. This resulted in unpredictable decisions that had little
precedential value. For example, courts could not broadly rule that
touching a coworker's hair always constituted sexual harassment.
What if a supervisor stroked a subordinate's hair during a department
meeting? Or, what if the supervisor touched the employee's hair in
response to her question about the appropriateness of her hair style
for work? 124 In an effort to resolve ambiguous cases, several circuit
117. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
118. See, e.g., Steel v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th
Cir. 1989); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982).
119. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
120. Id.
121. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
122. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
123. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483.
124. See Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288 (Fed.Cir. 1985)
(holding that similar behavior did not constitute harassment).
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courts developed a bright line rule requiring psychological injury,125
while other courts utilized a reasonable woman standard.
26
1. The Psychological Injury Requirement
Citing Meritor's language regarding the "emotional and
psychological stability' '127 of the workers, several circuit courts created
a bright line rule requiring proof that the alleged harassment resulted
in psychological injury to the plaintiff.128 Although this additional
requirement provided predictability and precedential value, it also
produced unfair results by focusing on a plaintiff's reactions instead
of a defendant's behavior.
29
First, requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate psychological injury
sometimes caused unfair results. For example, in Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., a computer department supervisor 30 frequently made
extremely vulgar and obscene remarks about women' in general,
as well as crude statements to the office manager in particular.
3 2
Furthermore, other male coworkers displayed pornographic pictures
of women in the common work areas. 33 Although the plaintiff and
other female employees complained, the company only slightly
admonished the supervisor, and the behavior continued. 3 4 Because
the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate psychological injury,'35 the
125. See infra notes 127-62 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
127. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (citing Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)); see
also supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1989);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987); Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir.
1986); Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
129. See Werner, supra note 110.
130. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615. Note that neither employee was in a supervisory
capacity over the other. Id.
131. Id. The supervisor frequently referred to women as "whores," "cunts,"
"pussy," and "tits." Id. at 623 (Keith, J., dissenting).
132. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624. The supervisor remarked: "All that bitch needs
is a good lay." Id. In addition, he called the plaintiff a "fat ass." Id.
133. Id. at 615. In dissent, Judge Keith described a poster placed in the common
area: "[Olne poster, which remained on the wall for eight years, showed a prone
woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf
club in hand, yelling 'Fore.' " Id. at 624.
134. Id. at 624.
135. Id. at 622. The court concluded that "Henry's. obscenities, although an-
noying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the
plaintiff or other female employees." Id. In addition, the court dismissed the
pornographic posters as a "de minimis effect on the plaintiff's work environment."
ld.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment for the defendant.
136
A comparison of Rabidue with Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.'37
demonstrates how the psychological injury requirement produced
unfair results. In Brooms, the company's human resource manager
frequently made sexual remarks and advances toward an industrial
nurse.' During an out-of-town conference, the manager asked the
nurse to have sex with him. 39 The nurse became so upset by this
request that she suffered physical illness and required medical
treatment. 140 Only a few months later the manager grabbed the
plaintiff and showed her pornographic pictures depicting sodomy
and bestiality; the nurse ran away screaming and fell down a flight
of stairs. 141 After this incident, the plaintiff quit and entered psychiatric
therapy for debilitating depression.
42
Because the plaintiff in Brooms was able to demonstrate
psyhological injury, she was successful in her sexual harassment
claim against her employer. 14 Arguably, the employee in Rabidue
worked in an equally hostile environment,'" but she lost her case
because she was unable to demonstrate a psychological injury.
45
Instead of using the bright line rule of psychological injury,
several circuit courts balanced the totality of the circumstances.' 46
136. Id. at 622-23.
137. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
138. Id. at 416.
139. Id. at 416 n.1.
140. Id. The nurse told her immediate supervisor about the human resource
manager's behavior. Id. The supervisor's only advice was to "tell [the manager]
that her husband [had given] her herpes and to tape-record her conversations with
[him]." Id.
141. Id. at 417.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
145. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
146. Instead of considering the facts as a whole, some district courts carved the
allegations into separate incidents which rarely constituted harassment when analyzed
alone. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 807 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa
1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993). Upon appeal the Eighth Circuit in
Burns reminded the district court it must consider the cumulative effect of the
alleged conduct, stating that "each successive episode has its predecessors, that the
impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment
created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes." Burns v. McGregor Elec.
Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992), on remand, 807 F. Supp. 506 (N.D.
Iowa 1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991)). But see Vance v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510-11 (lth Cir. 1989) (holding
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For example, in Ellison v. Brady, 47 a male employee developed a
relentless crush on a female coworker. In reaction to her refusal to
go on dates with him, the male employee began to engage in bizarre
behavior such as wearing inappropriately formal attire to work,
demanding conversations with the plaintiff, and even sending her
disturbing letters professing his admiration.148 Upon receipt of these
letters, the plaintiff filed both a request to transfer to another
company and a sexual harassment complaint.'
49
Pointing to Meritor's quotation of Rogers, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Ciruit explained that a hostile
environment may result in, but does not require, the complete
destruction of a worker's psychological stability. 50 Noting that the
protection of Title VII comes into play before the plaintiff requires
psychiatric assistance,'' the Ninth Circuit rejected the other circuits'
search for plaintiffs suffering from "anxiety and debilitation."'
15 2
Second, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate psychological injury
forced courts to focus on the plaintiff's behavior instead of the
defendant's conduct. For example, the court in Rabidue belabored
the plaintiff's aggressive and cantankerous personality'53 while seeming
to ignore the severity of the defendant's conduct. 54 In her dissent,
that an isolated incident of hanging a noose over a black employee's desk was
sufficiently severe by itself to amount to harassment).
147. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 874. The defendant sent the plaintiff a written message stating "I
cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such
constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel
your hatred for another day." Id. While the plaintiff was attending a training
seminar, the defendant sent her a card with a three page letter, proclaiming:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex .. .. Leaving
aside the hassles and disasters of recent weeks [sic]. I have enjoyed you
so mucth over these past few, months. Wa tc'hing you, ic.. Experiencing
you from 0 so far away [sic]. Admiring your style and elan [sic] ....
Don't you think it odd that two people who have never even talked
together, alone, are striking off such intense sparks ... I will [write]
another letter in the near future.
Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 878 n.8.
151. Id. at 878.
152. Id. at 877 (citing Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
153. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). The court "unfavorably" characterized the plaintiff
as "a capable, independent, ambitious, aggressive, intractable, and opinionated
individual." Id. It is arguable that these characteristics would not have been so
offensive to the court if they had been attributed to a male officer manager.
154. Id.
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Judge Keith emphasized that a plaintiff's negative personality traits
do not justify harassment."'
In contrast to Rabidue, the Eighth Circuit, in Burns v. McGregor
Electric Industries,5 6 recognized that a detailed examination of the
plaintiff's behavior may overshadow the significance of the defendant's
conduct.'57 Prior to working for the defendant, the plaintiff in Burns
posed nude for Easyrider and In the Wind magazines.' Upon
discovery of the photographs, the owner of the company repeatedly
asked the female employee to pose nude, watch pornographic movies,
and engage in sex. 1 9 In addition, coworkers began calling the plaintiff
vulgar names, and one worker even threatend to rape her on the
assembly line.' 60 Although the district court ruled that a reasonable
person would have found this behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create an abusive working environment, the court dismissed the
complaint explaining that anyone who could pose nude in such a
fashion could not have possibly been personally offended.' 6
The Eighth Circuit criticized the lower court, stating that a
plaintiff's private life, regardless of how offensive, does not give
permission to a coworker to sexually harass her. 62 The court explained
that this rationale would allow employers and coworkers to kiss or
sexually touch a female coworker simply because she allowed her
boyfriend or husband to do so at home. 63
2. The Reasonable Woman Standard
In addition to undertaking a subjective analysis, the factfinder
must determine whether a reasonable person would find the behavior
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment based
155. Id. at 625 (Keith, J., dissenting). In the dissent, Judge Keith reprimanded
the majority for being distracted from the severity of the defendant's conduct by
stating: "The record established plaintiff possessed negative personal traits. These
traits did not, however, justify the sex-based disparate treatment recounted above.
Whatever undesirable behavior plaintiff exhibited, it was clearly no worse than
Henry's." Id.
156. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
157. Id. at 963-64.
158. The pictures displayed her tatoos and pierced body parts. Burns v. McGregor
Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1992), on remand, 807 F. Supp. 506
(N.D. Iowa 1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 562.
161. Burns, 989 F.2d at 962-63.
162. Id. at 963; see also Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding that a plaintiff's use of foul language or sexual innuendo outside
of work did not waive her legal protection against harassment under Title VII).
163. Burns, 989 F.2d at 963.
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on a hostile working environment. However, an analysis based on
the genderless reasonable person may fail to account for the wide
divergence between men's and women's views of appropriate sexual
behavior.164 For example, women may be more likely to interpret
a verbal or physical sexual encounter as coercive or harassing, while
men are more likely to consider the same behavior as flattering or
desirable. 165
In recognition of this difference, several circuit courts have
adopted a "reasonable woman" or "reasonable victim" standard in
hostile environment cases,' 66 as was first suggested in Judge Keith's
vehement dissent in Rabidue.167 The majority in Rabidue concentrated
upon the working environment prior to the plaintiff's arrival.' 6 The
court described how some work environments are more vulgar than
others,' 69 thereby alluding to an assumption of risk theory that women
164. Se LARSON & LARSON, supra note 94, § 44A.44(e); Comment, Sexual Ha-
rassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1449, 1451 (1984).
165. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1989). Abrams also notes that today's
woman lives in a society where sexual violence has reached an all time high, and
a vast pornography industry perpetuates images of sexual coercion, violence, and
objectification. Id. at 1205.
166. See, e.g., Burns, 989 F.2d at 965; Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th
Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990);
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987).
167. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623-28 (Keith, J., dissenting).
Judge Keith stated:
I would have courts adopt the perspective of the reasonable victim which
simultaneously allows the courts to consider salient sociological differences
as well as shield employers from the neurotic complainant. Moreover,
unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants
as w,ll as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable
behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.
Id. at 626. Although Judge Keith was the first to suggest the "reasonable woman"
standard, it was not adopted until a year later. Yates, 819 F.2d at 636-37.
168. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. The court considered "the lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the environment of the work place both before and after the plaintiff's
introduction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff
upon voluntarily entering that environment." Id.
169. Id. The Sixth Circuit cited with approval Judge Newblatt's statement; "In-
deed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and
language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations, and girlie
magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this." Id.
at 620-21 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1984)); see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Title VII is
not a clean language act, and it does not require employers to extirpate all signs
of centures-old prejudices.").
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should not accept jobs in potentially offensive environments. 70 In
dissent, Judge Keith explained that the majority's analysis defeated
the purpose of Title VII by perpetuating working environments hostile
to women instead of bringing about social change and equality in
the workplace.'7 ' In addition, Judge Keith questioned whether the
majority would have been so eager to justify the prevailing environment
if the case had involved an antisemtic 172 or a racially hostile
environment. '"
Inspired by Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the reasonable woman standard in Ellison v. Brady. 174 Writing
for the majority, Judge Beezer explained that men are rarely the
victims of sexual assault, thereby making it difficult for men to
appreciate that a woman might perceive an unexpected sexual comment
or touch as an underlying threat of violence or coercion.'75 In
addition, the court concluded that the reasonable woman standard
was an essential tool for defeating ingrained sexist stereotypes and
prejudices.
76
Although theoretically attractive, the reasonable woman standard
may create several procedural problems. For example, male jurors
would be forced to hypothesize what a reasonable woman would
feel. 17 It has been suggested that perhaps expert witnesses on the
female psyche will be required to educate the jury on this standard. 1
78
Furthermore, application of the reasonable woman standard could
170. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id. Judge Keith stated in her dissent:
To condone the majority's notion of the "prevailing work place" I would
also have to agree that if an employer maintains an anti-semitic work
force and tolerates a work place in which "kike" jokes, displays of nazi
literature and anti-Jewish conversation "may abound," as Jewish employee
assumes the risk of working there, and a court must consider such a work
environment as "prevailing," I cannot.
Id.
173. Id. at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith reminded the majority that
"the relevant inquiry at hand is what the reasonable woman would find offensive,
not society, which at one point also condoned slavery." Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
174. 924 F.2d 872, 878-90 (9th Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 879.
176. Id. at 881. For an article that more fully discusses the advantages of the
reasonable woman standard, see Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless
Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1177 (1990).
177. See Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law:




produce an unwarranted focus on the victim instead of the perpetrator,
as does the psychological injury requirement.
79
By the time Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 80 reached the
Supreme Court in early October of 1993, it was clear from Henson8'
and Meritor'82 that sexual harassment based on a hostile working
environment was a type of discrimination prohibited by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.183 However, what behavior constituted actionable
harassment remained unclear. Several circuits relied on the bright
line rule requiring psychological injury which was derived from the
quotation in Meritor, 8 4 while other circuits utilized a reasonable
woman standard. Harris provided the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to resolve several important issues surrounding the claim
of sexual harassment based on a hostile working environment.
IV. REASONING
By its unanimous and very brief decision in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.,8' the Supreme Court resolved the division among the
circuit courts regarding the necessity of psychological injury in hostile
working environment cases. Justice O'Connor began the opinion by
explaining that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" was not limited
to tangible or economic discrimination but also included working
in a hostile environment. 8 6 Reasserting the standard created in Meritor,
Justice O'Connor explained that a work environment becomes hostile
when it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment." 87 Contrary to the holding in Rabidue,'88
the Supreme Court clarified that a hostile environment may alter
the conditions of employment long before the plaintiff suffers psy-
179. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting).
180. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
181. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 71-77 and accompanying
text.
182. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
184. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); see supra notes 87-
99 and accompanying text.
185. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). The majority opinion in Harris is only two and one
half pages long. Id. at 369-71.
186. Id. at 370.
187. Id. at 370 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
188. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
[Vol. 17:839
CIVIL RIGHTS
chological injury. 8 9 A discriminatorily hostile environment may suf-
ficiently alter the conditions of employment by detracting from an
employee's work performance, discouraging employees from re-
maining with the company, or preventing employees from advancing
their careers.'90 The Court explained that the frequently cited language
in Meritor regarding an environment so "heavily. polluted with dis-
crimination as to destroy completely the psychological stability of
minority workers" was merely an especially egregious example of,
and not the boundary for, sexual harassment. 9'
Once it had rejected the psychological injury requirement, the
Supreme Court instructed courts to consider the following factors
in order to determine whether the harassment is sufficiently hostile
to alter the conditions of employment: The frequency and severity
of the conduct, whether the conduct is physically threatening or
merely psychologically offensive, whether it unreasonably interferes
with the employee's performance, and the effect if any on the
employee's psychological well-being.' 92 The court emphasized that
psychological harm is not required, rather it is merely a factor to
be weighed equally with the rest. 93 Admitting that the newly created
standard was imprecise, 94 the Court concluded that it was a sat-
isfactory compromise between making any offensive conduct ac-
tionable and requiring a psychological injury. 95 Thus, the Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for consideration
using the newly created standard.
96
Affirming its decision in Meritor, the Supreme Court held that
a plaintiff must meet both the subjective and objective standards
to establish a viable claim.191 Although the United States District
189. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that "Title VII
comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." Id.
190. Id. at 370-71.
191. Id. at 371.
192. Id.
193. Id. Justice O'Connor clarified: "The effect on the employee's psychological
well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found
the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant
factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required." Id.
194. Id. The majority conceded that "[t]his is not, and by its nature cannot be,
a mathematically precise test." Id.
195. Id. at 370. Affirming the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Meritor, Justice
O'Connor stated that "[t]his standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle
path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring
the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury." Id.
196. Id. at 371.
197. Id. at 370. The majority explained:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
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Court for the Middle District of Tennessee appeared to have applied
the reasonable woman standard, 98 Justice O'Connor repeated the
traditional reasonable person standard.' 99 Justice O'Connor did not,
however, address a specific choice of terms or whether the reasonable
woman standard was legitimate.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
multifactored analysis provided little guidance to jurors because the
factors were not ranked according to significance.2 00 Recognizing that
the newly created test mimicked the negligence standard, Justice
Scalia noted that while injury is a required element of negligence,
the majority's standard attempts to determine whether an injury has
indeed occurred. 20 1 Reminiscent of the bright line rule of psychological
injury, Justice Scalia suggested that interference with work per-
formance should be the most heavily.weighed factor. 202 Justice Scalia
cautioned that "interference with work performance" should not be
limited to tangible work impairment but should be broadly construed
to include any alteration in working conditions.
20 3
Justice Ginsburg concluded the Court's review of Harris with
her brief concurring opinion. 204 The essential question for Justice
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
Id.
198. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444, at *7 (M.D.
Tenn. 1991). The district court ruled that, "[a] reasonable woman manager under
like circumstances would have been offended by Hardy. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
199. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71. Justice O'Connor used language indicating
the traditional reasonable person standard: "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment
that a reasonab e person woild find hostila nr abusive [andil Titl VII bars
conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being
.... " Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia criticized the majority
opinion, stating:
Today's opinion elaborates that the challenged conduct must be severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work envi-
ronment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive. "Abusive" . . . does not seem to me a very clear standard-and
I do not think that clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb
"objectively" or by applying to a "reasonable person's" notion of what





204. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Ginsburg was whether members of one sex are exposed to a hostile
environment, while the members of the opposite sex are not.2 °5 In
addition, Justice Ginsburg reminded Justice Scalia that a tangible






In Harris, the Supreme Court abandoned the certainty provided
by the psychological injury requirement in an effort to increase fair
results in sexual harassment cases based on a hostile working en-
vironment.2 07 In addition, Harris represents a significant victory for
a potential plaintiff because she or he will no longer have to suffer
a psychological injury to state a viable claim. 0 Harris therefore
brings an end to the confusion created by the Court's previous
quotation of Rogers in Meritor,20 9 and mends the rift between the
circuit courts.
The Court's broad definition of a hostile environment may be
seen as a triumph for women in the workplace. Instead of demanding
that women "face the heat or get out of the kitchen" as Rabidue
arguably implied, 210 Harris forces employers to promote more ac-
ceptable workplace behavior toward all of their employees. 21 Finally,
dispensing with the psychological injury requirement returns the focus
to the defendant's conduct.
21 2
The admittedly less than precise2"3 Harris standard sacrifices the
certainty and predictability afforded by the bright line rule of psy-
chological injury. Moreover, as mentioned in Justice Scalia's con-
currence, it is possible that the imprecise standard will leave jurors
"virtually unguided, ' 21 4 deciding cases solely based on their personal
experiences and prejudices. As a result, parties may be encouraged
205. Id. at 372-73.
206. Id. Justice Ginsburg clarified that "to show such interference, the plaintiff
need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of
the harassment." Id. (citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989)).
207. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
210. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
211. See David Schimmel, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: When Are Hostile
Comments Actionable?, 89 Ed. L. Rep. (West) 337 (May 1994).
212. See infra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
213. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
214. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19951
UALR LAW JOURNAL
to resolve their conflicts out of court instead of turning their cases
over to unpredictable juries.215 Moreover, the number of sexual
harassment claims is likely to increase because of the less restrictive
standard created by Harris. To shield themselves from liability,
employers should carefully document and thoroughly investigate every
allegation of harassment. Unfortunately, this could prove to be a
very expensive undertaking. 16
As mentioned by Justice Scalia, Harris leaves many issues un-
resolved, such as how frequent or pervasive the conduct must be,
and what evidence is required to demonstrate a work interference.
2 7
In addition, the Court did not address the reasonable woman stan-
dard. Although Justice O'Connor couched her opinion in terms of
a reasonable person, it is impossible to determine whether she rejected




In Harris, the Supreme Court rejected the psychological injury
requirement that several circuits derived from the troublesome quo-
tation in Meritor.19 The Court replaced the bright line psychological
injury requirement with a balancing approach that weighs factors
such as the severity, frequency, and offensiveness of the conduct.
220
While tangible factors such as psychological injury or work inter-
ference may be considered, they must not be determinative.2 21 Only
time will tell if Harris's less precise standard will be helpful in
deciding sexual harassment cases based on a hostile working
environment.
Deanna Weisse Turner
215. See John Leo, An Empty Ruling on Harassment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Nov. 29, 1993, at 20.
216. See Jana Howard Carvey, How Defense Litigators Should Respond to Harris
v. Forklift Systems, 8 INSIDE LITIG. 20 (1994).
217. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia observed
that "[als a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide
whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious
enough to warrant an award of damages." Id.
218. See generally Carvey, supra note 216.
219. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71; see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
220. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
221. Id.
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